Handling Privacy as Contextual Integrity in Virtual Communities

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Outline

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2 Contextual Integrity

3 Framework



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Question

Privacy is usually handled by security measures, e.g.:

- Trusted Computing (Sticky Policies[Mont03], Piolle[Pioll09], ...)
- Access Control (Bell-Lapadula[Bell73], PBAC[Byun05]...)
- Intrusive Control



Question

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How to minimize privacy violations when standard security measures are unapplicable?



Virtual Communities

Main application domain is Virtual Communities:

- Virtual enterprise
- Decentralised social networks

Properties:

- Open systems
- Decentralized
- Autonomous agents



Proposition

Detect privacy violation from the agent point of view.

- Propose a privacy violation formalism
- Specify an interaction framework
- · Define norms for privacy enforcement



Contextual Integrity

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Contextual Integrity: Nissenbaum 2004

- · Usually, private/public paradigm:
 - · private: transmission/use restrictions applies
 - · public: no restrictions
- Contextual integrity: no private/public, it only depends on the transmission context
 - every transmission can trigger a violation



Contextual Integrity: Nissenbaum 2004

"whether a particular action is determined a violation of privacy is a function of:

- the nature of the situation/context
- nature of the information with regard to the context
- roles of agents receiving the information
- · relation of agents to information subject
- terms of dissemination defined by the subject"

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Formalize it to check if a transmission is a violation or not.



Framework

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Main Idea

Agents have to reason:

- Before sending a message (propagator)
- Upon reception of a message (receiver)



Message Structure

A message is composed by unspecified information and the following meta-informations:

- Context Tags
- Target Tags
- Privacy Policies
- Transmission Chain

All meta-informations are signed by their author.

Appropriateness-laws

From Contextual Integrity theory, we say that a transmission is **appropriate** if:

- Transmission context correspond to the information nature
- 2 Receiving agent has a role within the transmission context
- 3 Target's preferences are respected

```
appropriate(M):-
fitcontext(C,M),
fitrole(C,M),
fitpolicy(M).
```



A-laws: fitcontext

Transmission context must correspond to the information nature.

```
fitcontext(C,M):-
 information(M,I),
 propagator(P,M),
 context(C,I),
 contexttag(C,P,M).
```



A-laws: fitrole

Agent must have a role within the transmission context.

```
fitrole(C,M):-
 receiver(Rc,M),
 role(Rc,R),
 rolecontext(R,C).
```



A-laws: fitpolicy

The target's preferences must be respected.

```
fitpolicy(M):-
 information(M,I),
 policy(P,T,I),
 target(T,I),
 policyvalid(P,I).
```



Enforcement?

What should an agent do to enforce these laws?



- Respect the Appropriateness laws
- 2 Sign the transmission chain before sending
- 3 Do not send information to untrusted agents
- Obligation of the property of the property
- 5 Punish agents violating PENs (this one included)

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Future Works

- Formalize trust/framework interaction
- Define good agents
- Do a testbed
- Show that agents violating the PENs are excluded from the system



Conclusion

- Framework for privacy in open and decentralized MAS (1st stage)
- Based on Contextual Integrity theory
- · Agents are both actors and judges in the system

Some issues to address:

- The minimum percentage of norm enforcing agents
- "Journalist problem"
- Reputation Paradox



Thank You

Thank you for your attention.

